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FROM DEMOCRATIC PEACE TO DEMOCRATIC 
DISTINCTIVENESS. A CRITIQUE OF DEMOCRATIC 
EXCEPTIONALISM IN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES 
 
Anna Geis & Wolfgang Wagner* 
 
I. THE “DEMOCRATIC TURN” IN PEACE AND 
CONFLICT RESEARCH 
Over the last two decades or so, there has been a “democratic turn” in 
peace and conflict research, i.e. the peculiar impact of democratic politics 
on a wide range of security issues has attracted more and more attention. 
Although the notion that democracy is a force for good has a long and 
eminent tradition, peace and conflict research has hardly pursued this line 
of thinking until Michael Doyle’s famous piece on “Kant, Liberal 
Legacies and Foreign Affairs” (Doyle 1983).1 Doyle’s article triggered the 
debate on the so-called ‘Democratic Peace’ which attracted attention by a 
wider IR audience interested in the liberalist challenge to structural, 
neorealist theorizing. However, even more significant than the 
‘Democratic Peace’ debate per se seems to us what John Owen aptly 
called a “democratic distinctiveness programme” (Owen 2004: 605) that 
has subsequently emerged from the Democratic Peace debate. Thus, two 
and a half decades after the publication of Doyle’s article, democratic 
politics has become the centre of gravity for a wide range of research in 
                                                 
* This paper was presented at the Millennium Annual Conference “Interrogating 
Democracy in International Relations” at the London School of Economics, 25/26 
October 2008. Wolfgang Wagner’s research for this paper emanates from RECON 
(Reconstituting Democracy in Europe), an Integrated Project supported by the European 
Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme (contract no. CIT4-CT-2006-028698). Anna 
Geis gratefully acknowledges generous funding by the German Research Foundation 
provided for a PRIF project on ‘democratic wars’, 
http://www.hsfk.de/index.php?id=140&L=1.. 
1 A notable exception is Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1972) whose influence has been limited to 
the German-speaking political science community. 
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peace and conflict research. Put in the positivist parlance that dominates 
this research area, democracy has become an obvious independent variable 
in developing explanations for a growing number of empirical puzzles.  
In the following paragraphs we will sketch what we consider a striking but 
not yet fully acknowledged development in recent peace and conflict 
research, namely the growing prominence of democratic politics in the 
study of international conflict more broadly. Previously distinct areas of 
research, e.g. on the impact of economic interdependence and international 
institutions on peace, have undergone a “democratic turn” and thus been 
brought under the umbrella of the democratic distinctiveness programme. 
As a consequence, a “democratic caveat” has been added to the 
commercial and institutional peace, i.e. the peaceful benefits of commerce 
and international institutions are understood to be reaped especially, if not 
exclusively by democracies (cf. Russett/Oneal 2001).  
Whereas the democratic turn in research on the commercial and 
institutional peace tends to contribute to an overall rosy picture of 
democracies in international relations, other scholars have argued for an 
inclusion of “democratic violence”, i.e. armed force exerted by 
democracies, into the democratic distinctiveness programme. Previously 
attributed to remaining pockets of un- or pre-democratic institutions and 
culture, democratic violence has been increasingly understood as an 
intrinsic flipside of democratic peacefulness. Although the incorporation 
of democratic violence into the democratic distinctiveness programme is a 
welcome step towards a more nuanced and self-critical study of 
democratic politics and international conflict, we argue that further critical 
reflection is needed.  
Research on democratic exceptionalism does not only provoke sceptical 
observations from a scientific point of view but it entails a number of 
normative pitfalls with serious political consequences. We will address 
three caveats in the conclusion: the “uncritical” use of the term 
“democracy”, the danger of lending legitimacy to democratization by war 
and of introducing (or reinforcing) an unsettling dichotomy between 
democracies and non-democracies into international political discourses in 
order to confer questionable privileges to the club of democracies. Against 
this backdrop, we plead for a more self-critical study of democratic 
security politics and strategies which is sensitive to ambivalences, 




tensions, contradictions and paradoxes of democratic principles, norms 
and practices. 
 
II. THE CORE OF DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS: 
THE “DEMOCRATIC PEACE” DEBATE 
The starting point of the “democratic distinctiveness programme” is the 
famous finding that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against 
each other.2 This finding introduced democracy as a cause of peace even 
though it only applied to the limited realm of relations between established 
democracies. With few exceptions,3 the subsequent “Democratic Peace 
Debate” (Brown/Lynn-Jones/Miller 1996) was a textbook example of 
positivist “normal science” with proponents and critics sharing common 
criteria for assessing each other’s arguments. Even though democracy is 
an inherently contested concept (Buchstein 2004), the datasets provided by 
POLITY and, to a lesser extent, Freedom House soon found widespread 
acceptance in quantitative analyses, not the least because they were 
unsuspicious of manipulation in favor of the Democratic Peace 
(Russett/Oneal 2001: 97). As a consequence, “democracy” in the context 
of the Democratic Peace became to be defined in terms of institutional 
constraints and political rights.4  
The early stages of this debate focused on the statistical significance of the 
empirical findings (cf. Spiro 1994; Russett 1995) and the control of 
possibly confounding explanatory variables. Methodological disputes 
about the appropriateness of statistical techniques have resurfaced ever 
since but have not again amounted to a serious challenge of the core 
findings. Rather, the Democratic Peace seems to have become a popular 
                                                 
2 For more comprehensive reviews of the Democratic Peace debate see, among others, the 
accounts by Chan (1997), Maoz (1997), Geis (2001) Rosato (2003), Müller/Wolff (2006). 
3 See for example Barkawi/Laffey (1999, 2001). 
4 The POLITY IV Project Dataset Users’ Manual defines a “mature and internally 
coherent” democracy as a political system in which „(a) political participation is fully 
competitive, (b) executive recruitment is elective, and (c) constraints on the chief 
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illustration for methodological disputes and has benefited from the 
resulting methodological refinements.  
The issue of “omitted variable bias” goes to the very heart of inter-
paradigm debate and has been heavily contested respectively. Indeed, 
proponents of competing schools of thought have made great efforts to 
demonstrate that their theoretical tool kit better accounts for the absence of 
war between democracies. Since neo-realism was at least then the most 
prominent theoretical alternative to the liberal theories of the Democratic 
Peace, its proponents were particularly eager to demonstrate that the 
Democratic Peace is better attributed to international power politics than 
to regime type (cf. Farber/Gowa 1995).  
Democratic Peace scholars have taken up the challenge and incorporated 
control variables to fend off allegations of omitted variable bias. Power 
ratios, alliances and levels of trade have become standard controls of any 
statistical analysis. At the same time, scholars moved beyond the analysis 
of wars (i.e. conflicts with a minimum of 1.000 battle-related deaths) to 
the examination of “Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)” more 
broadly.5 The inclusion of interactions involving the threat, display, or 
actual use of force was also welcome mainly for methodological reasons 
because MIDs are, by definition, less rare events than wars. The changing 
conceptualization of the dependent variable also brought about a re-
framing of the central research question: instead of inquiring into the law-
like (near) absence of wars between democracies, scholars now aimed to 
demonstrate that democratic dyads have a significantly lower probability 
of MIDs. The confirmation of these core hypotheses in a number of more 
sophisticated statistical analyses added to the success story of the 
Democratic Peace (cf. Bremer 1992; Maoz/Russett 1993). 
To be sure, the search for explanatory variables was no monopoly of 
quantitative approaches but included a considerable number of case 
studies as well. For example, John Owen (1994) and James Lee Ray 
(1995) used process-tracing to demonstrate the crucial importance of 
democratic norms and institutions. Following the editor of an impressive 
                                                 
5  The concept of MIDs is introduced in Gochman/Maoz (1984). Prominent studies of the 
Democratic using MIDs as dependent variables include Maoz/Abdolali (1989) and 
Maoz/Russett (1993). 




collection of case studies, however, the evidence from case studies was 
rather mixed: “domestic politics in general, and the democratic process in 
particular, crucially affect war and peace decision making, though not 
always in ways that are consistent with the democratic peace theory” 
(Elman 1997b: 474).  
Arguments that the Democratic Peace was better explained by previously 
omitted variables have continued to this day. Indeed, the widespread 
confidence in its core finding has made the Democratic Peace an attractive 
trophy in any inter-paradigm debate. It is telling, however, that the recent 
challenges have come from within the liberal or Kantian paradigm itself. 
For example, Erik Gartzke has argued that developments in economic 
activity, such as the integration of capital markets, better account for the 
absence of war among democracies.6 As a consequence, the discussion of 
omitted variables has by and large become a debate among proponents of 
a liberal paradigm which has replaced the debate between liberals and 
adherents of a power-based, realist paradigm. 
Even though the bulk of studies has confirmed the explanatory power of 
democracy for the level of violent conflict between states, the search for a 
theoretical account has not been completed (cf. Müller/Wolff 2006). Due 
to the simultaneous debate on the limits of rational choice theories and the 
merits of sociological approaches in IR (cf. Fearon/Wendt 2002), distinct 
rationalist and constructivist explanations have been developed, pitting 
democratic institutions against democratic norms.  
Democratic institutions have been regarded as rendering government 
policy responsive and accountable to a citizenry which is pictured as eager 
to preserve their lives and property and thus to abhor war. In a more 
formal vocabulary, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph 
Siverson, and Alastair Smith have argued that democracies are 
characterized by large “selectorates” (the proportion of society selecting 
the leadership). Because political leaders’ staying in power thus depends 
on a broad winning coalition, they are better off providing public goods 
(such as peace and economic growth) instead of private goods.7 An early 
wave of institutionalist theorizing also argued that “institutional 
                                                 
6 Cf. Gartzke (2003, 2007) as well as Dafoe (2008) for a critical review. 
7 For an outline of the “selectorate theory” cf. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). 
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constraints - a structure of division of powers, checks and balances - 
would make it difficult for democratic leaders to move their countries into 
war” (Russett 1993: 38). More recently, scholars have de-emphasized the 
constraining effects of domestic institutions and have instead highlighted 
that elections, open political competition and free media improve a 
government’s ability to send credible signals of its resolve (Fearon 1994; 
Schultz 1999). 
An alternative, “constructivist” account has emphasized democratic norms 
and culture instead of democratic institutions (cf. Doyle 1983; Russett 
1993; Maoz/Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Weart 1998). 
From this perspective, decision-makers “will try to follow the same norms 
of conflict resolution as have been developed within and characterize their 
domestic political processes” (Russett 1993: 35). Since democracies are 
characterized by peaceful conflict resolution, they will prefer negotiation 
over the use of force in international politics as well.8 This pacifist 
preference, however, only translates into peaceful relations with other 
democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995). In conflicts with non-democracies, 
democracies are according to advocates of the Democratic Peace forced to 
resort to realist strategies lest they risk being attacked (cf. Russett 1993: 
30-8; Maoz/Russett 1993: 625).  
The significance of the Democratic Peace for International Relations not 
only derives from a successful defence against a wide range of criticisms 
and its subsequent celebration as an example of progress in IR research 
(cf. Chernoff 2004; Ray 2003) but also from changes in Western 
democracies’ post-Cold War security strategies to which it contributed. 
Referring to central ideas of the Democratic Peace, the Clinton 
administration adopted the concept of “democratic enlargement” as a 
foreign policy strategy apt to foster international peace (as well as to serve 
US national interests). The subsequent George W. Bush administration 
elevated “democracy” to function as linchpin of their National Security 
Strategies (in critique Smith 2007). However, the use of the Democratic 
Peace as a legitimating strategy for the Iraq war caused embarrassment in 
                                                 
8 A recent critique of this argument provide Hellmann/Herborth (2008) who demonstrate 
at several “fisheries wars” between Western democracies how mature, interdependent 
democracies escalated their conflicts into militarized interstate disputes instead of seeking 
accommodating solutions. 




the Democratic Peace community (cf. Owen 2005; Russett 2005) and 
triggered a debate on scholarly responsibility (Ish-Shalom 2006). We will 
come back to this issue in the conclusion of our paper in more detail. 
 
III. FROM THE “DEMOCRATIC PEACE” TO A 
“KANTIAN PEACE” 
The success of the Democratic Peace inspired two closely interwoven 
developments in peace and conflict research. First, “Kantian protests” 
(MacMillan 1995) notwithstanding, Immanuel Kant was widely celebrated 
as the intellectual godfather of the Democratic Peace, and “Perpetual 
Peace” became a source of inspiration and authority (cf. Baum 2008). As a 
consequence, research on the pacifying effects of trade and international 
institutions gained new momentum as these venerable research traditions 
became subsumed under a “Kantian peace” (Oneal/Russett 1999; 
Russett/Starr 2000; Russett/Oneal 2001). Second, students of peace and 
conflict added more and more items to the list of what distinguishes 
democracies from other regimes in international (security) politics. These 
two developments were closely related because the renaissance of 
commercial peace- and institutional peace-studies soon made a 
“democratic turn”, i.e. democracy was identified as a favourable context 
condition. We will address these two developments in turn. 
 
A. COMMERCIAL PEACE  
The commercial peace thesis has a long and well-known tradition9 but did 
not figure prominently until the 1990s when it gained momentum in the 
wake of the Democratic Peace debate. Although Kant’s third definitive 
article in “Perpetual Peace” (1795) speaks of cosmopolitan law and 
universal hospitality, and the “spirit of commerce” is only mentioned in a 
supplement, the commercial peace thesis was quickly incorporated as one 
                                                 
9 The works of Adam Smith, Richard Cobden, Norman Angell and Joseph Schumpeter 
may be regarded as milestones in that tradition (for an overview cf. Doyle 1997: 230-50). 
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of three legs in a “Kantian triangle” (cf. Oneal/Russett 1999). Most 
proponents of the commercial peace have drawn on expected utility-
models and developed an “economic deterrence argument” (Levy 2002: 
356) according to which the anticipation of a disruption in trade deters 
political leaders from escalating conflicts.10 However, constructivist 
theorizing has also been present in the commercial peace literature. 
Drawing on Karl Deutsch’s work on security communities, Bruce Russett 
stressed that “economic exchange becomes a medium for communicating 
perspectives, interests, and desires on a broad range of matters not the 
subject of economic exchange, and that these communications form an 
important channel for conflict management” (Russett 1998: 374; cf. also 
Doyle 1997: chap. 8). 
Although several studies found support for the thesis that economically 
significant trade between states reduces the risk of armed conflict between 
them (e.g. Polachek 1980; Oneal/Russett 1997), a large number of scholars 
reported lasting doubts since the findings remained vulnerable to changes 
in concepts, data measurement or time periods studied (Mansfield/Pollins 
2003: 21). As a consequence, scholars called for the identification of 
context conditions for the commercial peace (cf. 
Schneider/Barbieri/Gleditsch 2003).  
Among the context conditions suggested are the level of economic 
development (cf. Hegre 2003), the institutionalization of trade relations 
(cf. Mansfield/Pevehouse 2003) and – most significant in the context of 
this paper – the regime type of the states engaged in trade. Christopher 
Gelpi and Joseph Grieco (2003, 2008) in particular have argued that 
democracies “react to greater trade integration with a reduced propensity 
to initiate militarized disputes with their partners” (2003: 2). Drawing on 
the selectorate theory, Gelpi and Grieco argue that democratic institutions 
entail incentives for leaders to provide public goods whereas for leaders in 
non-democracies it often appears rational to provide private benefits to 
                                                 
10 A reformulation of the expected utility-argument along the lines of James Fearon’s 
informational theory of conflict can be found in Morrow (1999) and Gartzke/Li/Boehmer 
(2001). According to these scholars, “[t]rade flows could reduce the risk of escalation by 
increasing the range of costly signals of resolve in a crisis. A greater range of available 
costly signals increases the efficiency of signalling between the disputants, increasing the 
chance that they will reach a peaceful settlement“ (Morrow 1999: 481). 




members of a small winning coalition. Following the standard economic 
argument about the effects of trade, Gelpi and Grieco maintain that leaders 
in democracies have particularly strong incentives to seek growth by 
fostering trade. Moreover, once a state has established high levels of trade 
with another country, democratic leaders can be expected to be vulnerable 
to possible interruptions of trade flows because missed growth 
opportunities may damage their prospects of being re-elected. As a 
consequence, democracies but not other regime types are expected to 
avoid armed conflict with states to which they have close economic 
relations. Gelpi and Grieco find robust support for this expectation for the 
period 1950-1992. 
The commercial peace can also be expected to be particularly strong 
among democracies because democracies tend to trade disproportionately 
among themselves. Harry Bliss and Bruce Russett (1998: 1128-9) listed 
several reasons for especially high levels of trade among democracies: 
First of all, leaders in democracies “need be less concerned that a 
democratic trading partner will use gains from trade to endanger their 
security than when their country trades with a nondemocracy”; 
furthermore, companies will “prefer to trade with those in states with 
whom relations are reliably peaceful” and where the rule of law precludes 
expropriations. Finally, shared norms “help reduce trade interference from 
embargoes and boycotts”. Further empirical studies found that 
democracies have a higher probability to conclude preferential trade 
agreements (Mansfield/Milner/Rosendorff 2000, 2002) and that 
democratization in developing countries is associated with trade 
liberalization (Milner/Kubota 2005). 
Taken together, the incorporation of the commercial peace into a “Kantian 
peace programme” has given a new impetus to the debate about economic 
interdependence and peace. Moreover, inconclusive empirical results have 
led to a search for context conditions which in turn has brought 
commercial peace research closer to the democratic distinctiveness 
programme. It is interesting to note that the revitalized commercial peace 
debate has, at least so far, hardly been taken up by policy circles. Although 
peace may seem an attractive selling point for further trade liberalization 
in a public climate of widespread scepticism, economic considerations 
have clearly dominated public discourse. In contrast to the institutional 
peace debate (see next section), the democratic turn in commercial peace 
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studies has also no discernible legitimating function for current policies, 
even though it could be used to justify a turn from global to regional, inter-
democratic trade regimes. Notwithstanding the merits of commercial 
peace research, its misleading equalization with Kant’s third definitive 
article has discouraged a more comprehensive exploration of Kant’s 
cosmopolitan law in peace and conflict studies (cf. Franceschet 2000: 283, 
295).11 
 
B. INSTITUTIONAL PEACE 
While there have always been countless studies on the contribution of a 
particular international institution to the management of a particular 
conflict, early large-n studies could not find any significant effect of 
membership in international institutions on the level of conflict between 
states (cf. especially Singer/Wallace 1970). This corresponded to a reading 
of Kant according to which his “federation of free states” is rather a result 
of than a cause for peace (cf. Moravcsik 1996). However, in the aftermath 
of the Democratic Peace debate a new wave of studies on the “institutional 
peace” emerged.  
Again, a broad range of causal mechanisms has been put forward to 
explain the pacifying effect of international institutions: They may reduce 
uncertainty by conveying information (Russett/Oneal/Davies 1998; 
Bearce/Omori 2005; Haftel 2007), they may act as mediators in a conflict 
(Haftel 2007) or, as in collective security institutions, even coerce norm-
breakers (Russett/Oneal/Davies 1998). Drawing on Fearon’s rationalist 
theory of war, Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom (2004) emphasize that 
institutions enable signaling and help to make commitments more 
credible. Finally, from a constructivist perspective, institutions may 
contribute to peace by creating trust (Bearce/Omori 2005), by generating 
narratives of mutual identification (Diez/Stetter/Albert 2006) and by 
                                                 
11 Kant’s cosmopolitan law is virtually absent from the Democratic or “Kantian” peace 
debate as discussed here but has instead been widely acknowledged by philosophers and 
political theorists who discuss his merits for concepts of a “cosmopolitan democracy”. 
We cannot deal with this issue here but see for example Archibugi (1995), Franceschet 
(2000) and the critical review by Eberl (2008). 




socializing states into norms of peaceful conflict resolution 
(Russett/Oneal/Davies 1998). 
In spite of a much later take-off than the commercial peace-debate, the 
courses of the two debates have shown striking similarities: Whereas 
several studies found evidence in support of an institutional peace, others 
failed to do so suggesting that the institutional peace thesis is vulnerable to 
changes in specification and measurement.12 The subsequent search for 
context conditions again led to a “democratic turn”, i.e. the regime type of 
the member states was identified as an important qualification of the 
institutional peace thesis. 
Democracies have been considered to have both particular inclinations and 
capacities to establish and maintain international institutions 
(Russett/Oneal 2001: 173). To a large extent, explanations for these 
particular features of democracies’ foreign policies have drawn on causal 
mechanisms familiar from explanations for the Democratic Peace and the 
commercial peace. For example, the selectorate theory holds that 
democracies tend to establish and maintain international institutions for 
the same reasons that they tend to avoid costly wars or promote trade: 
because democratic leaders face incentives to provide public goods, they 
will establish and maintain international institutions which help to do so. 
From a constructivist point of view, in contrast, democracies tend to 
cooperate among themselves for the same reason they maintain peaceful 
relations and high levels of trade: A common set of values fosters trust and 
overcomes otherwise prominent relative gains concerns, etc.  
Democracies are not only considered to be especially interested in 
international cooperation; they are also regarded to be particularly capable 
to establish and maintain international institutions. Again, the causal 
mechanisms that make democracies “reliable partners” (Lipson 2003) are 
familiar from the Democratic Peace. Most importantly, the checks and 
balances, transparency and openness characteristic of decision-making in 
democracies also contribute to their capability to establish and maintain 
international institutions (Ikenberry 2001). Because entering into an 
                                                 
12 Russett/Oneal/Davies (1998) and Oneal/Russett/Berbaum (2003) found that there is a 
significant effect of international institutions on peace whereas Bennett/Stam (2004) and 
Gartzke/Li/Boehmer (2001) found no supporting evidence. 
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international commitment requires the consent of parliaments, courts, 
interest groups etc., defection becomes less likely once such consent has 
been achieved (Cowhey 1993; Martin 2000).13 Moreover, free media and a 
vital civil society make the detection of defection likely which in turn 
helps to mitigate problems of monitoring characteristic of collective action 
problems (cf. Zangl 1999). From a constructivist perspective, one may add 
that democracies’ esteem for the rule of law extends to the honouring of 
international (legal) commitments (Gaubatz 1996).  
In another analogy to commercial peace-research, scholars of the 
institutional peace have argued that democracies cooperate 
disproportionately among themselves and that “interdemocratic 
institutions” (i.e. international institutions composed of democracies) are 
particularly effective in reaping the pacifying effects of cooperation. 
According to Hasenclever and Weiffen (2006), interdemocratic 
institutions are particularly suited to block escalation pathways between 
states that have been identified as typical steps to war. Because of 
democracies’ record as reliable partners, interdemocratic institutions are 
distinctively effective (1) in taming power competition by setting 
standards and verification schemes for appropriate defence policies; (2) in 
preventing the recourse to strategies of unilateral self-help by integrating 
domestic actors into international cooperation and (3) in averting an 
overall polarization of interstate relations by insulating “islands of 
cooperation” from more disputed domains.  
A number of empirical findings have supported the notion of a 
“democratic turn” in the institutional peace-debate: Cheryl Shanks, Harold 
Jacobson and Jeffrey Kaplan reported already in 1996 that „free states 
belonged on average to more IGOs than those that were partly free or 
unfree” (Shanks/Jacobson/Kaplan 1996: 609). More recently, this finding 
has been confirmed by Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom and Kevin 
Warnke (2004) who have listed those ten states that hold the most 
memberships in international organizations for 1965, 1985 and 2000: all 
three lists comprise exclusively democratic states. In a similar vein, 
Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse demonstrate that “democratization 
is a potent impetus to IO membership” because “[e]ntering IOs can help 
                                                 
13 In the terminology suggested by James Fearon, the “audience costs” of defection are 
higher in democracies than in other regimes. 




leaders in transitional states to make a credible commitment to sustain 
democratic reform” (2006: 139 and 140 respectively). In the realm of 
security institutions, Brett Ashley Leeds found that democratic states are 
less likely to violate alliance commitments (Leeds 2003). Most 
importantly, in a study covering the period between 1885 and 2000, Jon 
Pevehouse and Bruce Russett have provided empirical evidence that IGOs 
have the more pacifying effects the more democratic their member states 
are (Pevehouse/Russett 2006).  
Notwithstanding mounting empirical evidence, we consider the 
democratic turn in the institutional peace problematic in two, interrelated 
respects: First, in a similar vein as John MacMillan had already in 1995 
voiced a perceptive “Kantian protest”, here once again such a protest 
against an allegedly Kantian reading of inter-democratic institutions seems 
warranted. Doyle, Russett and many others understand Kant’s “federation 
of free countries” as a plea for interdemocratic cooperation as a nucleus of 
an expanding security community.14 However, there is considerable 
evidence drawn from Kant’s comprehensive writings that he imagined his 
federation of “free” states as comprising independent, sovereign states, but 
not necessarily exclusively liberal democratic states (MacMillan 1995: 
553-60; Müller 2005; Jahn 2005: 191; Eberl 2008: 200-4). 
Since “Perpetual Peace” is an obvious source of authority reaching out 
beyond the scholarly community (cf. Desch 2007/8: 11), this dispute is 
related to the second problem of the democratic turn, namely the 
assignment of legitimacy to inter-democratic institutions such as NATO 
and the EU. Such a democratic turn has potentially dramatic consequences 
as it weakens security institutions with mixed membership such as the 
United Nations or OSCE that were designed to foster peaceful cooperation 
among all member states, whether democracies or not. At the same time, 
institutions exclusively composed of democracies appear not only 
particularly capable but also legitimized to act on behalf of an otherwise 
“ineffective” international community (Ikenberry/Slaughter 2006: 7).  Just 
as the Democratic Peace lent dubious legitimacy to interventionist security 
doctrines (cf. Ish-Shalom 2006; Desch 2007/8), the democratic turn in 
institutional peace analysis may attribute legitimacy to military 
                                                 
14 See Doyle (1983: 226-7), Pevehouse/Russett (2006: 972); from a quite different 
theoretical perspective see also Desch (2007/8: 13) 
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interventions that, like the Kosovo campaign in 1999, lacks a clear basis in 
international law but enjoys the support of (most) democracies and of the 
international institutions they have formed. We will elaborate on this point 
in the conclusion of this paper. 
 
IV. DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS AND THE USE OF 
FORCE 
A. DEMOCRACIES BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND 
DEMOCRATIC WAR  
The emergence of a “democratic distinctiveness programme” has been 
most obvious with regard to the treatment of “democratic violence”, i.e. 
the use of force by democratic states. To be sure, even proponents of the 
so-called monadic Democratic Peace theory who assume that 
“democracies are more peaceful in general” (cf. Benoit 1996) never 
claimed that democracies do not fight wars; they only claim that 
democracies fight wars less frequently than other regimes. With some 
notable exceptions such as Michael Doyle (1983), John MacMillan (2004) 
and John Owen (1994, 1997), however, proponents of the Democratic 
Peace hardly analyzed the violence emanating from (liberal) democratic 
states in terms of its (liberal) democratic distinctiveness. If “democratic 
violence” surfaced at all, it was either presented as a challenge to the 
Democratic Peace proposition or treated as an un-democratic contaminant 
and pre-democratic relict.  
For example, in his study on US covert actions against elected 
governments during the Cold War period, David Forsythe argued that 
these actions at first glance seem inconsistent with the liberal analyses of 
inter-democratic relations. At closer look, however, covert actions appear 
to be possible only because “the decisions are not taken in the open, 
subject to the full range of checks and balances and popular participation” 
(1992: 393). Likewise, Ernst Otto Czempiel (1996) argued that wars by 
democracies such as the one fought by the United States in Vietnam point 
to a lack of democratic control even in otherwise mature democracies. In a 
similar vein, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, who demonstrated the 




enhanced risks of nationalist violence and war-proneness of democratizing 
regimes during their transition phase (Mansfield/Snyder 2005), do not 
question the democratic peace between mature, consolidated democracies 
but only “seek to introduce a note of caution into the policy prescriptions 
of those who would seek to use the democratic peace to justify an overly 
broad campaign of democracy promotion in the developing world that 
insufficiently reflects the special local conditions” (2005: 283). 
Notwithstanding vast differences in theoretical approaches and methods, 
these studies regard consolidated democracies as inherently peace-prone 
and attribute their aggression to pockets of un- or pre-democratic 
institutions and culture. 
The use of force by democracies figured more prominently in the more 
wide-spread dyadic variants of Democratic Peace research. The statement 
“democracies rarely if ever fight one another but are as war-prone as other 
regime-types” clearly captures the democratic “Janus face”, i.e. their 
capabilities and inclination for acting as peaceful as well as militant forces 
in world politics (Risse-Kappen 1995). However, since the Democratic 
Peace research originated in the refutation of central Realist assumptions 
about international politics, the “positive” puzzle of peaceful relations 
between consolidated democracies remained the primary focus of research 
for long (cf. Hellmann/Herborth 2008: 505). Academic and political 
attention for “democratic” or “liberal” wars then grew considerably in the 
light of an increased “democratic interventionism” after the end of the 
Cold War.15 
Partly backed by a revived UN Security Council, partly self-empowered, 
multi-party Western military actions were interpreted and legitimated in 
the West as so-called “humanitarian interventions” or as international law 
enforcement missions; they were officially fought in the name of restoring 
peace, of punishing lawbreakers and eliminating the foes of humanity, and 
of protecting human rights and promoting democracy (Brock 1999, 2006; 
Müller 2004). Democratic interventionism could thus be read as the 
violent manifestation of a liberal world ordering and governance project, 
attempting – but often failing – to export Western forms of rule, statehood 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Freedman (2005, 2006/7), Vasquez (2005), Chojnacki (2006), 
Geis/Brock/Müller (2006), Gleditsch/Christiansen/Hegre (2007). 
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and democracy (cf. Blaney 2001; Duffield 2001; Geis/Brock/Müller 
2006).  
Against this backdrop, parts of recent research on the use of force by 
Western liberal democracies investigate into inherently democratic or 
liberal contexts of this violence: Are liberal democracies inclined to 
special types of war? To which extent is this violence motivated and/or 
justified by (ambiguous) liberal-democratic norms and values? To what 
extent do democratic institutions induce the diversionary use of force? Do 
democracies form special kinds of alliances and security communities that 
are dependent on demarcation and distinction processes against an 
“other”? Are their modes of warfare distinct from other regime-types, and 
do they possess a special effectiveness in war? In the following we will 
briefly deal with these aspects of a “democratic war” as the flip-side of a 
“democratic peace”, which implies that the very same features that are 
responsible for peace among democracies are to be held accountable for 
democracies’ distinct record of using military force. 16 
 
B.  AMBIVALENCE OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY  
One of the central assumptions of Democratic Peace is that democratic 
institutions prevent self-interested governments from rushing to war since 
they circumscribe their scope of action, involve many actors and generate 
publicity, hence provide transparency and slow down the decision-making 
process. In contrast to this, researchers of the diversionary use of force 
have been discussing for a long time that democratic institutions might 
also create specific incentives for governments to start a war. The 
diversionary-use-of-force-thesis builds on the “rally around the flag 
effect” according to which the incumbent government’s popularity soars in 
the face of an external threat.17 An unpopular government may thus be 
                                                 
16 We have dealt extensively with these points elsewhere, see Geis/Brock/Müller (2006) 
and Geis/Müller/Wagner (2007). For an earlier suggestion to establish a research agenda 
on democracy and war see Chan (1993). 
17 The rally-around-the-flag effect was “discovered” by Kenneth Waltz (1967) and has 
been confirmed in a vast number of empirical studies ever since (cf. in particular Mueller 
1970 and 1973 as well as, most recently, Eichenberg/Stoll/Lebo 2006). 




tempted to provoke and escalate international crisis in order to divert 
attention away from domestic problems. However, the diversionary-use-
of-force-thesis has remained highly contested as empirical studies have 
yielded an ambiguous picture.18 In a recent attempt to integrate the 
diversionary use of force into the Democratic Peace agenda, Oneal and Tir 
(2006) conclude that economic conditions do indeed affect democracies’ 
(not autocracies’!) likelihood to use force but that sufficiently low 
economic growth rates are too rare to negate the Democratic Peace. 
Rationalist variants of Democratic Peace research model political elites as 
well as citizens in democracies as cost-sensitive and risk-averse actors 
which leads to the assumption that citizens are usually war-averse, shying 
away from the material and humanitarian costs of war, and that 
governments, interested in their re-election, will take these peaceful 
preferences into consideration. It has been criticized that this assumption is 
blind to reality since there are a number of instances where a majority of 
citizens – whether due to conviction or manipulation – was in favour for a 
military action and where reluctant governments were put under public 
pressure (cf. Reiter/Stam 2002: 144-63; Rosato 2003: 594-5). In his 
analysis on democracies losing “small wars”, Gil Merom (2003) found 
„inherent peaceful proclivities only in a minority of the citizens“ (Merom 
2003: 45; cf. Evangelista/Reppy 2008: 180-2).  
Citizens’ war aversion is context-dependent, since rational calculations 
and moral beliefs with regard to the use of force can be influenced by two 
factors both of which have acquired a new salience since the 1990s: First, 
the procurement of technologically advanced new weapons systems and 
the enhancing of military effectiveness can delude the population into 
thinking that “bloodless” wars and swift victories are possible and that 
expected benefits will excel the costs (Schörnig 2007a, b). As we will 
discuss in more detail below, the democratic principles of casualty 
aversion and force protection provide incentives for a special “Western 
way of war” (Shaw 2005; Müller/Schörnig 2008). Second, the moral 
aversion against the use of force can be influenced by references to “good” 
reasons for a military action such as protecting human rights; a war that 
can be portrayed as a fight for one’s own values does not necessarily 
                                                 
18 Cf., among many others, James/Oneal (1991), Meernik/Waterman (1996), Smith 
(1996), Gelpi (1997) and Gowa (1998). 
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contradict the “democratic peace” as such but rather points to the existence 
of its flipside of a democratic (or liberal) war. 
C. THE AMBIVALENCE OF LIBERAL NORMS 
In particular since the end of the Cold War liberal justifications have been 
playing an increasing role in legitimating Western use of force (cf. 
Hasenclever 2001; Freedman 2005).19 Already in 1983 Michael Doyle had 
pointed out that liberal democratic states fight wars for liberal purposes 
(Doyle 1983: 230), but public justifications do not have to be equivalent 
with the „true“ motives of a war-fighting government since such motives 
can be traced back to – in the liberal’s eye - less “noble” reasons such as 
geopolitical aggrandizement or satisfying domestic particular interest 
groups. The public normative underpinning of Western military actions 
has lent new impulses to a much older debate, predominantly conducted in 
political theory and philosophy, on the ambivalence of liberalism, i.e. on 
various strands of liberal thought which can be divided into more self-
restrained and more interventionist approaches to international politics. A 
new wave of Kant readings is an indicator of this revived debate; given the 
complexity, partial “blind spots” and contradictions of his works, it can 
hardly surprise that interpretations of Kant differ considerably in the 
question whether he was a staunch advocate of non-intervention or 
whether he developed liberal justifications for forcible interventions into 
non-democratic regimes.20 
The debate on the ambivalence of norms takes issue with the civilizing 
effects of liberal norms and values and sets forth the contradictions and 
tensions between several norms, which can foster the use of force. In 
international politics such tensions can, for example, result from the 
                                                 
19 This is not to say that such liberal justifications have not been used before, see for 
example the analysis by Mark Peceny (1999) on US interventions in the 20. century, 
which demonstrates how political elites justified such missions by references to security 
concerns as well as liberal values. 
20 See, for example, Müller (2006) and Desch (2007/8) for readings of Kant’s “unjust 
enemy” as fathering liberal interventions and see MacMillan (1995), Jahn (2005), Eberl 
(2008) and Walker (2008) for readings of a Kantian self-restraint and a prudent 
evolutionary approach to non-democracies. For further treatments of the ambivalence of 
liberal norms see also Owen (1997), Brock (1999, 2006), MacMillan (2004), Müller 
(2004), Müller/Wolff (2006) and Sørensen (2006). 




decoupling of procedural and substantial norms and can lead to 
questionable foreign policy strategies: On the one hand democracies seek 
to protect their popular sovereignty and reject tight regulation by 
international law, on the other hand they engage in the global promotion of 
liberal norms such as human rights and democracy, partly by force (Brock 
1999, 2006). The ambivalence of liberal democratic norms compels to 
decide between several goods, in case of the so-called humanitarian 
intervention (Holzgrefe/Keohane 2003) without UN mandate this decision 
involves the question whether one is allowed to kill people and violate 
international law in order to save other people. 
Liberal democratic institutions and political cultures build on assets of 
different strands of liberal thought, as has often been demonstrated at the 
example of the US political culture which contains normative structures 
that foster interventionist, missionary driving forces as well as a self-
restrained, “isolationist” approach to the outside world, restricting itself to 
regard the own country as a shining example but not attempting to convert 
others (cf. Desch 2007/8). This pluralisation (or at times: polarization) of 
political culture is no distinct feature of the United States since several 
Western political cultures exhibit pluralist normative structures rooted in 
different traditions of liberal thought (Müller 2004; Müller/Wolff 2006). 
Since cultures provide and circumscribe the universe of acceptable 
justifications for the use of force in a society, much depends on the 
interpretations of the ruling political coalitions. Left-liberal, liberal, 
conservative or socialist parties can cite quite different “legacies” of the 
own culture and can refer to quite different norms rendering the use of 
force appropriate or inappropriate for their own country (cf. MacMillan 
2004). Hence it is crucial for Democratic Peace and Democratic War 
research to scrutinize the ambivalent norms of a political culture and the 
(controversial) references to these norms by elites in order to establish 
whether the cultural structuration follows predominantly “pacifist” or 
“militant” lines (Müller 2004). 
Political cultures can also be read in terms of dominant self-images and 
images of an “other” in a liberal society, the fiction of a “nation’s” unity 
and a distinct identity has to be permanently constructed and reproduced. 
With regard to the peace- or war-proneness of a democracy it is revealing 
to study such constructions of self and other more closely since the 
existence of strong enemy images lends more legitimacy to a country’s 
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militancy. Such analyses of “othering” and identity politics abound in 
critical and “postmodern” security studies21 and should be acknowledged 
by Democratic Peace research since they provide a counterpart to overly 
optimistic Democratic Peace accounts about a rational and peaceful 
democratic public (Geis 2006). Liberal thought has dealt with the 
“enemies” of progress and civilianization from the very beginning, a 
recent rediscovery of Kant’s figure of the “unjust enemy” reminds of these 
seeds of illiberalism and self-empowerment to interventionism contained 
within liberalism itself (Müller 2006; Desch 2007/8). For such 
interpretations of Kant the logical distance from Königsberg to Kandahar 
is not too far since democratic peace between civilized lawful regimes and 
democratic war against evil terrorists in Afghanistan root in the same 
liberal thinking. 
To be sure, Kant’s hostis iniustus as foe of humankind is one extreme 
representation of a liberal’s “other”, but the tendency to denigrate non-
liberal “others” has been a notorious trait of liberal imperialism throughout 
history. In the past as well as in the present, liberalism has often been 
criticized for an inherent imperialism (cf. Barkawi/Laffey 2001; Jahn 
2005) which manifests itself not only in a sense of superiority towards 
other cultures and regimes but also in the violent „civilianization“ of 
others in the name of democracy, freedom and progress. Under the cover 
of universalism Western democracies seek to impose their concepts of the 
political, economic and cultural organization of life upon the illiberal 
„other“. The recent Iraq war which the US and Great Britain have also 
justified with the aim of regime change underlines that such liberal 
ordering claims are no remains of the past. From this perspective, “rogue 
states” impede the progress of civilianization, they pose a threat to other 
state’s physical and normative security and must be forced to change their 
regime. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Western democracies usually have not 
conducted their military missions (be it full-fledged wars, peace 
enforcement or other missions involving armed forces) on their own, but 
rely on the contribution of NATO, ‘coalitions of the willing’ or most 
recently, the European Union. The integration of democracies’ military 
capabilities within international security organizations has raised the issue 
                                                 
21 See, among many others, Campbell (1992). 




whether their development into security communities with a shared 
collective identity is contingent upon the existence or construction of a 
dangerous “other” outside (Risse-Kappen 1995; cf. 
Dembinski/Hasenclever/Wagner 2004). Dynamics of inclusion/exclusion 
and the “search” for (new) threats in order to stabilize and discipline the 
“inside” can aggravate international conflicts instead of defusing them (cf. 
Williams/Neumann 2000; Williams 2001). 
 
D. MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AND WARFARE OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACIES  
The peace-proneness of democracies that Democratic Peace research 
ascribes to them is not only qualified by the ambivalences of democratic 
accountability and liberal norms but also by democracies’ military 
capabilities and effectiveness once fighting started. Dan Reiter and Allan 
Stam in particular have brought this classical topic of military academies 
into the remit of the democratic distinctiveness programme. In 
„Democracies at War“ (2002), Reiter and Stam argue that democracies 
have won more than three quarters of their wars since 1815. In contrast to 
Realist orthodoxy, Reiter and Stam do not trace military effectiveness 
back to the usual „hard“ factors such as economic power or number of 
troops and material, nor to the joint fighting power of alliances, but to two 
distinct democratic mechanisms, „the skeleton and spirit of democracy“ 
(2002: 9): Since democratic leaders are dependent upon the majority 
consent of their citizens and since political decisions are deliberated in the 
public, governments will only decide to wage a war if the prospects to win 
are well established (cf. also Gelpi/Griesdorf 2001). Furthermore, Reiter 
and Stam ascribe superior abilities, training and motivation to soldiers in 
democracies the roots of which lie in a special liberal-democratic political 
culture which puts a premium upon individual initiative and performance. 
This cultural appreciation for the individual and his/her capacities ensures 
the selection of a competent and able military leadership and motivates the 
individual soldiers to effective fighting.  
Reiter’s and Stam’s book triggered a debate on the solidity of the data and 
the plausibility of the explanations of such a „democratic triumphalism“ 
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(Desch 2002; Brooks 2003; Biddle/Long 2004). Although the main thesis 
has thus remained controversial, it is again democratic distinctiveness that 
has been placed at the centre of a debate that used to be a home ground for 
military historians and scholars highly sceptical of the public’s 
interference into military politics. 
„Democracies at War“ also casts a dark shadow on normative explanations 
of the Democratic Peace. Reiter and Stam (2002: 144-63) demonstrate in 
empirical cases that majorities of citizens have opted in favour of war – 
even in the absence of imminent danger – and the governments followed 
them in that (cf. Rosato 2003: 595). However, public support typically 
lasts only a short time and quickly drops once casualties mount 
(Reiter/Stam 2002: 164-92). 
“Casualty aversion” as a putatively distinctive trait of democratic publics 
(cf. Smith 2005) has recently directed researchers’ attention to 
peculiarities of Western democracies’ armament strategies and modes of 
warfare.22 The latest ‚revolution in military affairs’, which has been 
advanced by the US in particular and which utilizes the advancements in 
information and computer technologies for the armed forces, has been 
debated in this context (O’Hanlon 2000; Møller 2002). Extensive 
reconnaissance, an improved integration of different weapons systems and 
a higher speed and precision of weapons are the goals of this ‚revolution‘ 
in arms technology; the reduction of costs and risks is its central motive 
(Müller/Schörnig 2002). The use of such weapons leads democratic 
publics to believe in short successful military missions with few casualties, 
although the reality of warfare departs from this (Shaw 2005): Though 
democracies have improved the protection of their own soldiers since the 
end of the Cold War, the killing of civilians still occurs at a frequency that 
challenges “humanitarian” claims to spare the lives of non-combatants. In 
addition, Western soldiers operating in recent missions such as 
Afghanistan or Iraq are frequently targeted by asymmetric means of 
warfare. As these missions have made clear, the technological ‘revolution’ 
in warfare is of very limited use for fighting in “small wars” against 
guerrilla groups or terrorists.  
                                                 
22  See, for example, Müller/Schörnig (2002, 2008), Petrova (2008), Schörnig (2007a, b), 
Watts (2008) and the comprehensive study by the military sociologist Martin Shaw on the 
“Western way of warfare” (2005). 




While „casualty aversion“ is a central concept for the utilitarian as well as 
the normative-cultural causal mechanism of the Democratic Peace, there 
are three problems with it: First, it is not quite clear to what extent it really 
exists – nevertheless political leaders dread it and attempt to hedge 
themselves against the risk of losing votes at home (Schörnig 2007a: 100-
4). It is, of course, impossible to establish a fixed threshold or any other 
approximation of number of fatalities in a particular war beyond which a 
democratic public or significant groups within a society will start to 
oppose the war openly and demand a withdrawal. A recent study suggests 
that a democratic public is rather averse to defeat than to casualties, i.e. as 
long as the majority of citizens can discern a clear (and “right”) goal of a 
mission and are confident that this goal is attainable, they will support this 
mission (cf. Gelpi/Feaver/Reifler 2005/6). Second, it is questionable 
whether the sensitivity to casualties is a distinct feature of liberal 
democratic societies since the esteem for human life can be assumed to 
exist in individuals of autocratic societies as well (Evangelista/Reppy 
2008: 172) – albeit with the decisive difference that people’s grievance at 
casualties will not be displayed as publicly and their wish for the 
withdrawal of soldiers would not be voiced openly in an autocracy 
(Müller/Schörnig 2008: 194). Third, casualty aversion of a democratic 
public is usually founded on a norm hierarchy of casualties, putting a 
country’s own civilians on top of this hierarchy, followed by one’s own 
soldiers, and only in the third place come civilians of the opponent 
country, while their soldiers rank lowest in the concern about victims of 
violence (Schörnig 2007a: 97; Watts 2008: 54-5).   
Hence in „Western ways of warfare“ the protection of the own forces and 
risk minimization take absolute priority over the protection of the local 
civilians (Shaw 2005), resulting in a number of legitimacy and credibility 
problems for liberal democracies, especially in “humanitarian 
interventions”.  However, the concern for the adversary’s civilians – 
whose killing is often cynically labelled “collateral damage” – has also 
been growing in recent years due to increased media observation of 
Western warfare and due to NGO campaigning against harmful warfare 
strategies on non-combatants (Petrova 2008; Watts 2008: 56). 
The recent surge of research on democratic violence is a welcome 
amendment to the Democratic Peace literature as it highlights the “dark 
sides” of democratic politics for international security that are closely 
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intertwined with the bright sides of inter-democratic peace and 
cooperation. Although many findings remain contested and subject to 
further study and revision, the extension of the democratic distinctiveness 
programme to various aspects of democratic violence promises to sketch a 
much more comprehensive and accurate picture of democratic politics’ 
impact on international security. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: THE PITFALLS OF AN EXPANDING 
DEMOCRATIC DISTINCTIVENESS PROGRAMME  
Scholarly interest in the peculiar impact of democratic politics on 
(international) security has reached beyond the more established fields of 
democratic peace and violence discussed above. Thus, in the realm of 
intrastate violence, an agenda of a “democratic civil peace” has been 
developing. In an early study, Krain and Myers found that “non 
democracies are more civil war prone than democracies” (1997: 114) and 
Rudolph Rummel concurred that democracy reduces the occurrence of 
intense violence within states (Rummel 1997). In a more comprehensive 
study, Hegre et al. (2001) found that both democracies and harshly 
authoritarian states have few civil wars. However, the democratic civil 
peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable 
because autocracies are less stable than democracies and regime change 
are frequently accompanied by domestic violence. 
As a review of contemporary conflict studies shows, there are in principle 
no limits in extending the democratic distinctiveness programme to ever 
further aspects of (international) security. While civil-military relations 
and intelligence cooperation have been suggested as objects of future 
research (George/Bennett 2005: 58; Doyle 1996: 365-6), the examination 
of arms control policies (Müller/Becker 2008), terrorism (Abrahms 2007) 
and internal security cooperation (Wagner 2003) has already begun. Taken 
together, a multitude of studies suggests that the theoretical tool kit 
developed to explain the (near) absence of war between democracies can 
be useful to address an ever broader range of (security) issues in 
international politics. To be sure, research on the economic, power-related 
or cultural causes of conflict has certainly not been replaced by the 




democratic distinctiveness agenda but for almost any puzzle in peace and 
conflict research, the distinct impact of democratic politics has become an 
obvious point of departure. The democratic distinctiveness programme has 
therefore been celebrated as a “powerful paradigm” (Doyle 1996: 364) or 
“progressive research programme” in the Lakatosian sense (Ray 2003).  
However, although the rise of this programme has fostered collaboration 
across previously unconnected areas of research, a new form of 
“democratic triumphalism” that often comes with it is highly problematic. 
In the remainder of this paper we address both research-related and 
normative problems. 
From a scholarly point of view, research on democratic exceptionalism 
will have to provide much more in-depth case studies which trace the 
influence of specific democratic institutions and norms in detail. While 
there have been calls in earlier Democratic Peace research for such a 
“qualitative turn” (e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995; Elman 1997a), the response up 
to date seems inadequate. This also implies conducting more comparative 
case studies of non-democratic cultures and decision-making processes if 
democratic “distinctiveness” is really to be established. It is, for example, 
obvious that the unsettled issue of casualty aversion needs to be addressed 
in a comparative perspective (cf. Watts 2008). It is also to consider 
whether some of the norms that are regarded as “democratic” (and as such 
held responsible for a democratic peace or democratic war) should not 
more precisely be identified as “liberal” norms (cf. Owen 1997; 
MacMillan 2004). Much of democratic distinctiveness research, conducted 
by “Western” scholars, tends to equate democracy with liberal democracy. 
The last point leads us to a number of normative pitfalls which entail 
serious political consequences. There are at least three caveats which need 
to be addressed by scholars investigating democratic exceptionalism23: 
first, the “uncritical” use of the term “democracy”; second, the danger of 
lending legitimacy to democratization by war; and third, the moral and 
institutional privileging and self-empowerment of liberal democracies in 
world politics: 
                                                 
23 Authors of this paper included. Researching into democratic distinctiveness ourselves, 
we do certainly not pretend to have solved the problems addressed in the conclusion. 
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First, most research relies on the widely used democracy indices by 
POLITY and Freedom House, and does not reflect any further that the 
“content” of democracy is controversial, and that “democracy” remains a 
contested concept (Buchstein 2004). Virtually ignored are, among others, 
radical democratic readings of Kant’s idea of a republic as has for example 
been proposed by Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1996). Such readings scathe the 
lacking democraticness of real existing democracies and postulate much 
more transparency and citizens’ participation in foreign policy.24 Czempiel 
had rightly pointed out that Democratic Peace research did not incorporate 
insights from democratic theory and did not problematize the practices of 
real existing “democracies”. This caveat has up to date not been 
adequately heeded (cf. also Ish-Shalom 2006). In addition, most research 
is disinterested in current debates on the gradual erosion of democratic 
conditions and principles through processes of globalization and the 
internationalization of politics. Since democratic distinctiveness seems to 
be contingent upon stable domestic conditions, research would benefit 
from considering the debates in democratic theory and empirical studies 
on the crisis of democracy.25 
Second, the finding that democracies do not fight each other has had a 
tremendous impact on the foreign policies of Western democracies. After 
the end of the Cold War, consecutive US administrations have made the 
promotion of democracy a key strategy of their foreign policy. Democratic 
peace theory has become democratic practice, with explicit references to 
scholarly writings by politicians (Grayson 2003; Ish-Shalom 2006; 
Büger/Villumsen 2007). As far as democracies promote the spread of their 
regime type by peaceful means, one might not want to object too heavily 
against this foreign policy strategy, but things look quite different if the 
“democratic peace” is used as legitimating cover for democratization by 
war (cf. Grimm/Merkel 2008). Proponents of forcible democratization of 
                                                 
24 There are some Democratic Peace studies that have opened up the “black box” of 
democracy and distinguish different institutional types of democracies or parliamentary 
oversight powers, see e.g. Elman (2000) and Dieterich/Hummel/Marschall (2007). Such 
approaches, however, remain within the established lines of institutionalist readings of 
democracy. In contrast, we are hinting here at ‘radical’ critiques of existing democracies. 
For a comprehensive treatment of radical democratic readings of Kant see Eberl (2008) 
25 See, for example, Colin Crouch’s work on „post-democracy“ (2004). That Democratic 
Peace research lacks sensitivity for the faults of the capitalist dynamics in international 
relations has been set forth in Barkawi/Laffey (2001). 




key countries could be found in the Clinton and in particular the Bush 
administration (Smith 2007), and it is well known that the Iraq war has 
partly been justified with the aim of regime change and of triggering a 
democratic “domino effect” in the Middle East. The disaster of the Iraq 
war and scathing critique of such “illiberal liberalism” (Desch 2007/8) has 
in the meantime probably defused such ambitions, but the idea of a 
“democratic intervention” as such has obviously not been completely 
discredited, at least if it follows a “humanitarian intervention” (Merkel 
2008). 
It is important to note that calls for forcible democratization have found 
little support in the Democratic Peace research community. However, Dan 
Reiter and Allen Stam are a notable exception. They concluded their book 
on democracies at war (2002) with some considerations on US foreign 
policy in the 21. century, in particular the desirability of peaceful and 
forcible democracy promotion. Underlining that the spread of democracy 
is desirable because it “advances the human condition by protecting 
freedom and directly serves the American national interest by helping 
sustain a peaceful, more prosperous world” (2002: 203), they did not 
hesitate to declare: “(…) complete pessimism is unwarranted; military 
force can promote social stability and the advance of democracy. We urge 
policy-makers to be willing to use force for this end if the conditions for 
success, especially a society that enjoys the proper institutional, cultural, 
and economic conditions, seem to be present” (2002: 204). To be sure, the 
bulk of Democratic Peace scholars has been rather critical of forcible 
democratization, and notably Bruce Russett complained that Democratic 
Peace research has been wrongfully exploited and perverted by politicians 
(Russett 2005: 396). Whatever the explicit position on forcible 
democratization Democratic Peace scholars take, the question remains in 
which indirect ways Democratic Peace research has nevertheless 
contributed to pave the intellectual ground for democratic wars.  
Third, as indicated above (section 3.2), democratic distinctiveness research 
conveys the impression that cooperation between democracies (such as 
NATO and EU) is especially stable and beneficial while cooperation in 
heterogeneous settings (such as the United Nations) might be laborious 
and ineffective. The thrust of the democratic distinctiveness programme, 
and the democratic turn in institutional peace research in particular lends 
legitimacy to a worldview that divides the population of states along the 
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binary lines of democracies and non-democracies and ascribes higher 
morality and credibility as well as institutional privileges to the group of 
democracies.  
The propagation of a liberal international law in recent years which allots 
more (interventionist) rights to democracies and the growing support for a 
“concert of democracies” as a new counter-part to an ineffective United 
Nations Security Council are more than troubling developments, 
reinforcing the classification into first- and second-class regimes.26 The 
large bipartisan “Princeton Project on National Security” pleads for such a 
“concert of democracies” as the “institutional embodiment and ratification 
of the ‘democratic peace’” (Ikenberry/Slaughter 2006: 25). In the same 
vein, Robert Kagan explicitly votes for such a “concert of democracies” as 
a complement to the United Nations: “If successful, it could help bestow 
legitimacy on actions that democratic nations deem necessary but 
autocratic nations refuse to countenance – as NATO conferred legitimacy 
on the intervention in Kosovo. In a world increasingly divided along 
democratic and autocratic lines, the world’s democrats will have to stick 
together.” (Kagan 2008: 98). Remarkably enough, the very same people 
who pretend to regret that the world is increasingly divided along the 
regime type line, contribute actively to constructing such a division and 
even reinforcing it. And once again, such ideas have travelled from 
academe into politics, so is for example the Republican presidential 
candidate John McCain currently voicing the idea of a “league of 
democracies” in his election campaign. 
So, where do these caveats leave us, if we do not want to discard a 
democratic distinctiveness research altogether? There is no easy way out 
of probing a democratic exceptionalism and at the same time having to 
avoid reinforcing a political dichotomy of regime types in world politics. 
Modest as it may sound, we plead for introducing more self-criticism and 
self-reflection into research and for refraining from constructing overly 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Feinstein/Slaughter (2004), in critique of a liberal international law 
see Reus-Smit (2005) and Smith (2007: chap. 6). A noteworthy argument for the 
privileging of democracies in international law is given by Buchanan and Keohane (2004: 
19): They find democracies to meet their “standard for comparative moral reliability” and 
believe that “when democracies violate cosmopolitan principles, they are more likely to 
be criticized by their citizens for doing so, and will be more likely to rectify their 
behavior in response.” 




complacent images of “our” own policies vis-à-vis other states. Special 
capacities of democracies to foster peace need to be contrasted with their 
equally tremendous capacities to use force. As we have argued above, 
democratic peace and democratic war might be closer linked than is 
obvious at first glance; both pertain to the liberal legacy and in this sense 
render the way from Kant’s Königsberg “perpetual peace” to today’s 
NATO-led “war on terror” in Kandahar a rather short one. 
Not only with regard to the core of the democratic distinctiveness 
programme, decisions of war and peace, but also to all other security issue 
areas we therefore suggest to investigate into the ambivalences, 
contradictions, tensions and paradoxes of democratic principles, norms 
and institutions (cf. Müller 2004). Taking recourse to the Frankfurt school 
tradition and drawing from other fields of research on democracy such as 
democratic theory and comparative politics would enable us to get a more 
balanced picture of democracies’ record in security-related issues and to 
be cautious against overly optimistic concepts of civilianizing global 
politics. What is required, in other words, is a critical theory of democratic 
peace (Müller/Schörnig 2008: 189; cf. Hasenclever/Wagner 2004: 469; 
Geis 2006; Geis/Müller/Wagner 2007). The progressivist philosophy of 
history which underlies ‘classic’ Democratic Peace research (Rengger 
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